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Combating Corruption
In November of 2011, The University of Chicago Legal Forum, joining forces with the American Bar Association's Global
Anti-Corruption Task Force, hosted its annual Symposium to
discuss the challenges of combating corruption on multiple
fronts. Against the backdrop of the Citizens United decision, recurrent global bribery, and corporate scandals, fifteen speakers
debated the merits and deficiencies of various anticorruption
strategies. As the dust settled following the 2008 financial crisis,
the Symposium also offered speakers the opportunity to comment on the ensuing litigation and legislation. Some participants
looked for evidence of corruption-an corresponding prophylactic measures-in the wind-up to the 2008 crisis.
Former US Attorney Patrick Fitzgerald delivered the keynote speech, describing anticorruptidn prosecutions occurring
during his eleven-year tenure as US Attorney for the Northern
District of Illinois, including the investigations of Governors
George Ryan and Rod Blagojevich. Fitzgerald's speech-the text
of which is included in this Volume-highlights the costs of public corruption, both economic and non-economic, and reminds
readers of the stakes in the fight against corruption. Fitzgerald
advocates for citizen vigilance and against complacency and the
kind of fatalistic attitude that regards corruption as an inevitable condition for political or commercial activity.
The first set of Articles in this Volume concerns the scope
and deterrence of public sector corruption. Professor Richard
Myers grapples with the potential for prosecutorial discretion to
hinder effective punishment of public corruption. At the heart of
this problem, he notes, is the fact that enumerating the victims
of public corruption is not always as straightforward an exercise
as it is in most criminal matters. Moreover, prosecutors are public-and sometimes elected-officials, and their status as such
may tempt them to be either overly lenient to a fellow political
insider, or overly harsh to appease angry constituents. Pervasive
press accounts, which stir public sympathy, also complicate public corruption proceedings. Professor Myers proposes an alternative mechanism: a proxy victim panel, consisting of a representative sample of victims, to consult with the prosecutor and weigh
in on sentencing.

Professor Paul Carrington also voices concern about the effective punishment of public-sector corruption, but his scope is
global. Professor Carrington outlines the history and effectiveness of the US False Claims Act (FCA), focusing on the private
enforcement mechanism employed by qui tam relators, which he
regards as a valuable anticorruption weapon. As an alternative
to the current system, in which domestic entities like the Department of Justice and international entities like the World
Bank face jurisdictional problems, Professor Carrington envisions a global regime of private enforcement-an international
army of qui tam relators.
Professor Philip Nichols examines many of the issues raised
by his fellow contributors -including systemic political corruption and over-broad prosecutorial discretion-through the lens of
a case study: the corruption trials of two former Ukrainian prime
ministers. Professor Nichols identifies the intersection of and
distinction between theoretical conceptions of corruption and
specific legal rules aimed at ameliorating corruption's symptoms:
wire fraud, money laundering, and so forth. Professor Nichols,
though, calls for legal theorists to de-emphasize these latter
mechanisms-legal rules aimed at specific behaviors-and to
embrace broader understandings of corruption as systemic and
intricately interwoven into some political spheres, particularly in
developing economies like Ukraine's.
The second set of Articles in this Volume addresses the challenge of combating corporate corruption, a Symposium panel topic that sparked lively debate in the wake of the global financial
crisis. Professor Peter Henning identifies an accountability gap
in the field of serious corporate wrongdoing: absent clear criminal conduct, an executive will often go unpunished for fraud or
misconduct that occurred during her tenure. Professor Henning
advocates for broader SEC authority to bar executives who may
not be directly responsible for fraud, but on whose watches misconduct has repeatedly occurred. Though SEC debarment may
not carry the same weight as criminal conviction, Professor Henning argues, it would increase executive accountability for passive disregard of corrupt behavior.
Lisa Noller examines another anticorruption mechanism:
the whistleblower suit. Unlike Professor Henning, who calls for
greater use of his weapon of choice, Noller cautions that prosecutors should seek balance in their pursuit of whistleblower claims.
Noller questions whether the enormous monetary rewards paid
to whistleblowers provide truly necessary encouragement, and

she notes that whistleblower claims often lead to investigations
whose costs are borne by the government (and, by extension,
taxpayers). She also speculates that whistleblower rewards minimize a corporation's incentives to develop a robust internal compliance program, since the company may have to pay large settlements to whistleblowers regardless of whether it had internal
enforcement mechanisms in place. To remedy these incentive
alignment problems, Noller proposes a dollar cap on plaintiff recovery and a jurisdictional requirement that whistleblowers report their claims internally first.
Ryan Rohlfsen explores the reach of US laws aimed at deterring corporate corruption in the form of criminal commercial
bribery statutes. Though the Volume contains multiple discussions of laws forbidding government bribery-such as the Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA)-Rohlfsen's Article addresses illicit payments to commercial actors. Rohlfsen speculates that, as
US companies widen their global reach, prosecutors will increasingly turn to mechanisms like the federal Travel Act and state
commercial bribery laws to combat illicit and corrupt corporate
influence.
The last set of Articles looks at corruption on a global scale,
often highlighting parallels to domestic efforts to combat corruption. Pascale Dubois, for instance, draws on her experience at the
World Bank to compare the Bank's sanctioning mechanism of
debarment to the US Federal Acquisition Regulation, a set of
guidelines for transacting with government contractors. These
two anticorruption devices vary in their particulars, but have
both yielded results. Dubois suggests, accordingly, that differing
approaches to corrupt entities may be equally effective.
Charles Smith and Britney Parling also look at a US statute
in the global context, exploring the extraterritorial boundaries of
the FCPA. Beginning with the Department of Justice's prosecution of Norwegian company Statoil in 2006, Smith and Parling
trace the history of FCPA enforcement actions against foreign
companies. Smith and Parling question the legitimacy of these
extraterritorial extensions of the statute and speculate that such
investigations have led to claims that US prosecutors are engaging in "imperialist" imposition of American values. To remedy
this perceived problem, Smith and Parling recommend measures
prosecutors might implement when investigating foreign corruption, including respecting data privacy laws, conducting industry-wide sweeps, and deferring more to local authorities.

Finally, Andrew Boutros and T. Markus Funk are concerned
not with situations in which the US prosecutes foreign companies in lieu of local enforcement, but with situations in which
local entities duplicate US charges in so-called "carbon copy"
prosecutions. Procedural and constitutional considerations arise
from these duplicate prosecutions. Boutros and Funk predict that
this trend-which often leaves companies facing liability in multiple jurisdictions-will continue and they discuss the practical
implications for companies that make disclosures to US investigators.
The Volume's student, contributions trace the contours of
some of the legal weapons useful for combating corruption; from
the FCPA to the Federal Anti-Bribery Statute to RICO, these
Comments attempt to resolve unsettled questions arising from
interpretation and implementation. Joshua Mahoney evaluates a
recent constitutional challenge to the Civil War-era False Claims
Act, one of the oldest federal anticorruption statutes. The FCA
requires that private qui tam relators' claims be kept under seal
for at least sixty days-and in some cases for over a year. In
2010, the ACLU challenged the constitutionality of the sealing
provision for relators' claims, arguing that the provision violated
the "right of access" doctrine under the First Amendment. The
Fourth Circuit was unconvinced and held that the government
had a "compelling interest" in keeping the records under seal.
Though he ultimately agrees with the outcome, Mahoney questions the premise: he contends that the court should not have
determined the applicability of the First Amendment using the
"right of access" doctrine. Instead, Mahoney reexamines the
statute through the lens of the "public employment" doctrine,
which he determines is better suited to the inquiry.
Melanie Harmon also addresses an anticorruption device
from a constitutional perspective, though her Comment deals not
with qui tam relators but with wiretap evidence. She looks to the
intersection of the Fourth Amendment and Title III, the federal
wiretapping statue passed in 1968, to determine the admissibility of evidence in instances in which a wiretap investigation was
flawed in some respect. Harmon identifies a circuit split over the
question of whether specific language about evidence admissibility in Title III precludes judicial invocation of the good faith exception to the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule. Finding the
arguments in favor of rejecting the good faith exception illconceived, Harmon concludes that courts should apply the good

faith exception and admit wiretap evidence derived from some
certain types of "flawed" investigations.
Unlike Harmon, who advocates for a broader reading of a
statutory provision, Stephen Hagenbuch calls for a narrower
reading of the phrase "foreign official" in the FCPA. Hagenbuch
examines competing prosecutorial and judicial interpretations of
the word "instrumentality" in the statute's definition of "foreign
official" and voices concern that the vagueness of the word has
the potential to broaden prosecutorial discretion to an untenable
level. Without a clear and comprehensive understanding of the
category of foreign entities described by the word "instrumentality," nearly any actor could be deemed a foreign official subject to
the FCPA or relevant corrupt entities could be omitted. Ultimately, Hagenbuch argues that courts should perform a "control
analysis"-or an evaluation of the degree to which a foreign government controls the entity in question-to determine whether
an actor is a "foreign official" for purposes of the FCPA.
Like Hagenbuch, Diane Shrewsbury addresses the problem
of potential over-inclusiveness arising from ambiguous statutory
language. Shrewsbury catalogs differing interpretations of the
phrase "corruptly persuades" in a provision of the Victim and
Witness Protection Act of 1982 aimed at deterring improper witness tampering. Shrewsbury attempts to identify the types of
witness interaction that qualify as "corrupt" persuasion and finds
that the approach advanced by some courts may include innocuous exchanges like a defendant informing her witness spouse of
the existence of marital privilege. Shrewsbury concludes that
courts should require evidence of both knowledge and intent to
hold that a defendant attempted to "corruptly persuade" a witness.
In their Comments, Christine Woodin and Cara Chomski
each evaluate another product of the 1980s: the Federal AntiBribery Statute. Woodin examines the provision of the statute
forbidding theft of, or bribery using, funds provided by the federal government and notes the difficulty of determining the appropriate unit of prosecution under the statute. In particular, the
text of the relevant statute contains dollar thresholds for the
punishable corrupt acts. Courts have struggled to determine
whether the jurisdictional dollar amounts are a floor or a ceiling-that is, whether the amounts are indicative of the prescribed unit of prosecution. To resolve the resulting circuit split,
Woodin proposes an alternative reading that applies one unit of
prosecution to bribery and another to embezzlement.

Chomski addresses the extraterritorial reach of the Federal
Anti-Bribery Statute, which she regards as a critical tool for limiting the corrupt behavior of individuals and entities working as
civilian contractors for the US government abroad. Applying a
US statute to foreign entities, though, raises due process concerns, and Chomski identifies a circuit split among federal courts
attempting to determine the appropriate standard by which to
evaluate jurisdiction over foreigners. Chomski ultimately concludes that this circuit split is illusory and makes the novel suggestion that courts should use a Worldwide Volkswagon minimum contacts test to determine whether they have jurisdiction
over foreign entities.
Finally, Eliza Riffe looks at the effect of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1996 (PSLRA) on the anticorruption
mechanism created by the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act (RICO). In particular, the PSLRA forbids
plaintiffs from suing under RICO's civil provision for conduct
that otherwise "would have been actionable" as securities fraud.
Federal courts have failed to reach a consensus on what the
phrase "would have been actionable" means. Riffe first identifies
two distinct methodologies judges have used to answer this question. Then, citing legislative history, the need for anticorruption
measures in the enforcement arsenal, and the importance of preserving jurisprudential legitimacy, Riffe argues that all courts
should make use of the more rigorous of the two approacheswhat she calls an "actionability analysis."
Running throughout all of this Volume's Articles and Comments is a call for balance. Every Symposium participant or student author voiced concern-overtly or through implicationabout being over- or under-inclusive when devising methods for
combating corruption. As Fitzgerald highlights in his keynote,
the stakes are high, as corruption results in costly societal damage-particularly loss of institutional trust. As several Symposium participants noted, though, high stakes alone might not justify broad strokes.

